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they will be received. These grounds bear scrutiny, although the Uniform Rules
suggest a guide.
It should be borne in mind that there is great injustice to the party who is
forced to hear the court say:
38
The affidavits disclose gross and inexcusable misconduct ...but the evil, if any, is
established in this state by the legislative authority, and can only be cured by
amendment.
The problem seems beyond the court's solution in the light of the rationale behind
the present judicial exception, particularly in view of the decision in Kollert.
Therefore the legislature should again modify the severity of the exclusionary rule
as it was disposed to do almost a century ago. 39
William E. Johnston
CRIMINAL LAW: SLIGHT MOVEMENTS WITHIN AN ENcLosuRE CONSTITUTE
KIDNAPING
Can one be kidnaped without being removed from his house or dwelling?
In People v. Wein,' the California Supreme Court held that the crime could be
committed under precisely those circumstances.
The defendant gained admittance to the victim's apartment under a ruse,
intending to commit a robbery, menaced her with a knife, tied her hands with
wire, and forced her to walk 25 feet to a desk. Finding no money there he told
the victim to crawl about 50 feet into the bedroom where there was money in
a dresser drawer. The intruder found the money, about $18, and put it in his
pocket. Thereafter, while brandishing the knife, he forced the victim to submit
to an act of sexual perversion,2 after which she was raped.3
This incident is typical of the defendant's attacks on eight women, for
which he was convicted on five counts of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery
under Penal Code Section 209 and seventeen other felonies.4 As noted above,
the victim was forced to move a total of 75 feet. The other victims of the de-
fendant's attacks were forced to move lesser distances within their dwellings,
the smallest of which was four or five feet onto a bed. This is the only known
case reported in California where the victim was moved less than six feet and
the word "kidnap" was used to describe the act.5
For the convictions under Penal Code Section 209 the jury prescribed the
death penalty. This section was originally enacted in 1901.6 It was amended
in 1933 and 1951. In its present form it provides:
Any person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps,
or carries away any individual by any means whatsoever with intent to hold or detain
88 See note 13 supra.
39 See the Laws of 1862, at 38, amendment to the Practice Act; to the effect that jurors
may impeach their own verdicts when arrived at by chance.
1
SO Cal. 2d.....,326 P.2d 457 (1958).
2 Violation of CAL. PEN. CODE § 288a.
8 Violation Of CAL. PEN. CODE § 261(3).
4 50 Cal. 2d at ....... 326 P.2d at 461 (1958).
5People v. Thompson, 133 Cal. App. 2d 4, 284 P.2d 39 (1955); People v. Hunter, 49 Cal.
App. 2d 243, 121 P.2d 529 (1942).
6 Cal. Stat. 1901, ch. 83, § 1, p. 98.
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or who holds or detains such individual for ransom, reward or to commit extortion
or to exact from relatives or friends of such person any money or valuable thing,
or any person who kidnaps or carries away any individoal to commit robbery . .. is
guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall suffer death or shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state prison for life without possibility of parole .... (Em-
phasis added.)
The death penalty is at the discretion of the jury if the victim suffers bodily
harm. If the bodily harm factor is not present then only life imprisonment with-
out possibility of parole is prescribed.
It can be seen that when robbery is involved the victim must be kidnaped
or carried away for the crime to come within the definition of this section. Section
209 itself does not define kidnaping. This is defined in Penal Code Section 207
which therefore becomes pertinent in applying the above robbery provisions to
the facts of a particular case.
Section 207 originally was declaratory of the common-law requirement that
the victim be carried across a county or state line. It was later modified with
the addition of the words "or into another part of the same county."7 It is sig-
nificant that, when the words "into another part of the same county" were added,
the legislature did not amend or abolish Penal Code Section 236 which defines
the crime of false imprisonment as the "unlawful violation of the personal liberty
of another." The punishment for violation of Section 207 is not less than one nor
more than twenty-five years imprisonment.8 Violations of Section 236 are punish-
able by a fine of $500 or up to one year imprisonment if the crime does not involve
the use of violence, menace, fraud or deceit and one to ten years if any of the above
factors are present.9
It may be inferred that the legislature intended Section 236 to punish trans-
gressions of personal liberty which were not of the type which the words "carries
... into another part of the same county" reasonably imply. It can be seriously
doubted that small movements of a victim within one enclosure were contem-
plated by the legislators when they amended Section 207.
Prior to the principal case kidnaping has usually been confined to cases where
the asportation was from one enclosure to another, into or out of an enclosure, or
some distance in a vehicle. It is noteworthy, however, that in none of the convic-
tions under Section 207 had the asportation been entirely within one enclosure.
As mentioned above, Section 207 necessarily becomes pertinent when the
robbery provisions of Section 209 are invoked. Section 209 was first enacted
in 1901 with no express mention being made of the word kidnaping. Later, in
1933, it was amended to read, "Every person who seizes, confines, inveigles,
entices, decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away any individual with
intent to hold or detain ... for ransom, reward or to commit extortion or robbery
. . . is guilty of a felony." (Emphasis added.) 10 Under this amendment there
were convictions where the victims were only moved a short distance," the
courts relying upon the words "seize" and "confine."' 12 The so-called "standstill"
7 Cal. Stat. 1905, ch. 493, § 1, p. 653.
8 CAL. PEN. CODE § 208.
9 CAL. PEN. CODE § 237.
10 Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 685, § 1, p. 1757.
"1 People v. Dugger, 5 Cal. 2d 337, 54 P.2d 707 (1936).
12 People v. Tanner, 3 Cal. 2d 279, 44 P.2d 324 (1935).
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kidnaping became possible' 3 and any act of robbery could be prosecuted under
Section 209.
In People v. Tanner (victims forced to move about within house),14 and in
People v. Knowles (victims moved about within store),15 both decided on the
basis of the 1933 amendment to Section 209, the court held that movement was
not necessary for conviction when the victims were robbed. But in both cases
the court relied not on the words "kidnaps or carries away," but on the words
which require a minimum of movement. These cases should not, therefore, be
used as the basis for a judicial definition of kidnaping.
In 1951, subsequent to the Knowles decision, the legislature again amended
Section 209 to its present form. As amended, the robbery victim must be kid-
naped or carried away for the offense to come within the requisites of Section 209.
In People v. Chessman'6 the California Supreme Court first reviewed the
1951 amendment. The court held that mere detention was not enough, but that
the movement of the victim twenty-two feet from the car of her escort to that
of her abductor fulfilled the kidnaping requisites. Justice Schauer, writing the
majority opinion, ruled, "It is the fact, not the distance, of forcible removal
which constitutes kidnaping in this state . "...17 (Emphasis added.)
Is forcing a victim five feet onto a bed an act of forcible removal? In the
Wein case the court did not further explain the meaning of forcible removal but
merely adopted it as descriptive of the defendant's acts. The court relied entirely
on the authority of the Chessman case. Justice Spence said, referring to the
amount of movement required, that "under the reasoning and language of the
Chessman case, any of these distances sufficed for a conviction."' 8:
In the Chessman decision the court cited California cases in which the issue
of distance was not raised or which were decided under the 1933 amendment to
Section 209.' 9 A North Dakota case, also cited, employed the same words as
did Section 209 prior to the 1951 amendment.20 The above cases, however, are
not sound authority for the decision in the Wein case because they were decided
under statutes which required no movement whatsoever.
Moreover, the fact situation in the Wein case can be clearly distinguished
from that of the Chessman case where the victim was removed from one enclosure
into another (automobiles). In the Wein case the victims were not removed from
an enclosure, a factual dissimilarity sufficient to warrant distinctions between the
natures of the crimes.
Since neither the authority relied upon in the Chessman decision nor that
decision itself are applicable in deciding the instant case, the reasoning used
there should not be applied to the Wein case. Justice Carter, as the lone dissenter,
13 Comment, 3 STAN. L. REV. 156 (1951).
143 Cal. 2d 279, 44 P.2d 324 (1935).
1535 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.2d 1 (1950). Criticized in 38 CA=.. L. Rav. 920 (1950) and in
24 So. CALm. L. REV. 310 (1950-51).
16 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 915 (1951).
17Id. at 192, 238 P.2d at 1017.
18 50 Cal. 2d at ........ 326 P.2d at 466.
19 People v. Oganesoff, 81 Cal. App. 2d 709, 184 P.2d 953 (1947) ; People v. Shields, 70 Cal.
App. 2d 628, 161 P.2d 475 (1945) ; People v. Melendrez, 25 Cal. App. 2d 490, 77 P.2d 870 (1938) ;
People v. Cook, 18 Cal. App. 2d 625, 64 P.2d 449 (1937); People v. Raucho, 8 Cal. App. 2d
655, 47 P.2d 1108 (1935).
2 0 State v. Taylor, 70 N.D. 201, 293 N.W. 219 (1940), citing People v. Melendrez, 25 Cal.
App. 2d 490, 77 P.2d 870 (1938).
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argued inter alia, that the word "kidnaps" should be defined in Section 209 as
it has been under Section 207.21
In his dissent in the Knowles case, Justice Edmonds expressed his belief
that if the control of the victim's location is transitory or incidental to the effec-
tive completion of other criminal acts, there is no kidnaping.2 2 Surely such reason-
ing would be valid when the victim is not even removed from a single room, as in
the principal case. It would seem to be doing violence to the plain meaning of the
words to describe such a situation with the phrase "kidnaps or carries away."1
23
It would have been reasonable for the court to have held that the legislative
intent in the 1951 amendment was to change the requisites of Section 209 where
robbery was involved, contemplating the more lengthy type of asportation.2 It
will be noted that this amendment did not abolish the standstill type of kidnap
altogether. In cases of ransom, reward or extortion the words, "seizes, confines,
inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals," are still effective. With this decision
it can be seen that if the above was indeed the intent of the legislature, it has not
been carried out by the courts. In his dissent in the Wein case Justice Carter
stated:2
As a result of the Chessman and the instant decision, while robbery is not per se a
violation of Section 209, if the robber moves his victims one inch he is subject to the
death penalty.
The court explains that it is not its duty to place some uncertain distance
limitations upon the language of the statute.2 6 There is, however, nothing to
prevent the court from distinguishing between different types of crime. Every
kidnaping includes the offense of false imprisonment, but it does not logically
follow that the converse is true. Should there not, then, be some effort made to
distinguish the requisites of kidnaping from those of false imprisonment? It is
difficult for one to conceive of a robbery where the victim is not required to
move about to some extent. Under the reasoning of this case, the perpetrator
will have subjected himself to a minimum penalty of life imprisonment, if the
prosecuting attorney invokes Section 209. This is not comparable to the minimum
penalty for first degree robbery, which is five years imprisonment. 27 It does not
seem possible that the legislature would intend such a discrepancy in punishment
between two similar crimes.
The latest decision of the California Supreme Court has apparently obviated
the 1951 amendment insofar as it applies to robbery. Future legislative action
seems to be the only solution to an intolerable situation which will not otherwise
be cured. As Justice Spence said when speaking of Section 209 in the Wein case:
28
If this section, as interpreted by this court, is regarded as too harsh, the remedy is for
the legislature to redefine kidnaping ....
George B. Hendry
21 50 Cal. 2d at ......... 326 P.2d at 476.
22 35 Cal. 2d at 203, 217 P.2d at 18.
23 See People v. Florio, 301 N.Y. 46, 92 N.E.2d 881 (1950).
24 See People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 189, 217 P.2d 1, 9 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
25 50 Cal. 2d at ........ 326 P.2d at 479.
20 Id. at ......... 326 P.2d at 466.
27 CAL. PEN. CODE § 211.
28 50 Cal. 2d at ......... 326 P.2d at 466.
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